This following series will look at the pivotal men and women who were either responsible or held accountable for the disaster that occurred at the Chernobyl Nuclear Station on April 26, 1986.
This first entry takes a deep dive into Viktor Brukhanov, the director of the Chernobyl Nuclear Energy Station. He was the one who signed off on every decision made that would lead to one of the most impactful nuclear disasters in history. By the end of April 1986, over forty million people had been put at risk, resulting in a loss of life that can never be fully quantified.
Devoted Party Man
Viktor Brukhanov did not start life as a corrupt bureaucrat, but he grew up a devoted party man in the Soviet Union, and that meant it was almost impossible to escape corruption. Just thirty-four when chosen, he believed he could build the greatest nuclear facility in the world and became the director of what would eventually be named the Chernobyl Atomic Energy Station.
What he did not know was his arrival in Ukraine coincided with the first signs of economic collapse for the communist utopia. Decades of military expansion had taken a toll on the party’s ability to provide even the basics for its citizens.
The USSR thought it could build complicated nuclear facilities that would be both safe and prosperous, while people queued for days just to purchase bread and other necessities. Of course, we now understand the truth, but in the era when Brukhanov grew up, one did not question the authority of the party leaders.
Born December 1, 1935, in Uzbekistan (then a part of the Soviet Union), Brukhanov was a product of Joseph Stalin’s Russia. These post World War II years became known as the Great Terror, as Stalin’s grip on the nation became one of history’s most authoritarian.
Spies were everywhere, even among family members. A single misspoken word could mean years in a prison camp. Often, a son or daughter might report an innocent comment by a mother or father. Neighbors could be dangerous. One never spoke their true mind outside their home.
Members of the population learned to keep their thoughts private. In the fantastic writing, The Whisperers, Russian expert and author Orlando Figes, presents a society that is literally afraid of itself.
To make a career for oneself in the years of the Great Terror necessarily involved moral compromise, if not by outright informing, then by silent collusion with the Stalinist regime. Proletarian writer, Konstantin Simonov, on his death-bed in 1979, shared a rare honest insight into the Stalin years. He spoke of a pervasive moral compromise.
Simonov further noted that the true horror wasn’t just Stalin’s actions, but how people became desensitized to the surrounding evil. Young adults in their early 20s began to see extraordinary events — disappearances, killings — as normal, living amidst these atrocities without truly seeing or hearing them. This environment of normalized terror shaped the mindset of an entire generation.1
Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, trust was something no man or woman could depend on. By all accounts, Brukhanov had a decent family life, free of too much strife, but the atmosphere was one of basic distrust. He was smart and understood what being a loyal member of the communist party meant.
Education
Among his brothers, Viktor was the only one who pursued higher education. He earned an electrical engineering degree from the Energy Department of the Tashkent Polytechnic.
Over the next seven years, he worked in various positions at the Angren Thermal Power Plant. Each position, from duty de-aerator installer to workshop director, showed he was a man who was going places.
He then spent four years at the Slavyanskaya Thermal Power Plant, before being selected to build the first Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine (also part of the Soviet Union). Of course, this would be the Chernobyl Nuclear Energy Station, and he would be completely in charge.
This was where his career took off. The Soviets had a great need for energy, and an even greater need to show to the world its place in the world of nuclear energy.
The Build-Up: Years of Cutting Corners
Brukhanov’s first trip to Chernobyl was in February 1970. On the cold winter’s day, he had to wade in snow and stay in the small town’s only hotel. He had brought his wife and young daughter, and even finding some sort of daycare was a challenge.2
Construction of the city of Pripyat started in 1970, and by April 1986 would be home to almost 50,000 people. The city was located just a mile-and-a-half from the nuclear facility. It was a Communist utopia that would be a show place for Soviet architecture.3
The living standards were much better than in other parts of the USSR, with modern well-stocked supermarkets. Western imports were also readily found in stores.
Pripyat would eventually become a top destination for young party members, offering a Ferris wheel for families, nice stores, better-than-average housing, and an Olympic-sized swimming pool.
But the construction was a challenge Brukhanov was unprepared for. Constant shortages meant he could not get quality building materials. For the first two years, he made the best of the situation, but by July 1972, he realized he would fail.
At a breaking point, Brukhanov got in his car and drove from Chernobyl to Kiev to meet with his party boss, the party appointed supervisor from the Energy Ministry. Upon arrival, Viktor handed his boss a letter of resignation.4
In true Soviet style, the supervisor ripped up the letter in front of Brukhanov. The message was clear: get the job done and quit complaining.
This rejection epitomized the Soviet approach to industrial development in the 1970s. Officials were expected to deliver results at any cost, with the empire teetering on the brink of bankruptcy. Brukhanov, similar to other Soviet bureaucrats during his era, used improvisation, shortcuts, and manipulation of data to meet deadlines that were not realistically feasible.
Feeling helpless in a situation with no possibility of success, Brukhanov took shortcuts with determination. This was because he was on a mission. Brukhanov took these actions to avoid going to prison for as long as possible, knowing that he would be blamed when things went wrong.
One glaring example of this approach was the use of flammable bitumen to cover the roof of the plant’s turbine hall. When the Ministry of Energy discovered this, they ordered its replacement. However, the flame-resistant material required for the re-roofing wasn’t being manufactured in the USSR. Instead of addressing this critical safety issue, the Ministry issued a waiver.5
Brukhanov must have known better than to believe Moscow would side with him just because they gave him a waiver. All of his paranoia would prove itself well founded. But in the middle 70s through the 80s, there was a job to do. Build a nuclear facility with substandard equipment.
In 1983, a full three years before the disaster that would make world-wide headlines, the SBU (Ukraine) informed Moscow leadership of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant was one of the most dangerous nuclear power plants in the USSR due to lack of safety equipment.6
Moscow’s Awareness and Inaction
Thanks to the release of once top-secret documents since the fall of the USSR in the early 1990s, we now know that the Kremlin had planted KGB informants within the facility, who reported on safety concerns. These concerns sometimes resulted in inspections that were swept under the rug. Despite this knowledge, constructing the Chernobyl plant continued unabated. Brukhanov must have understood he was being set up for being the scapegoat, if there ever was a problem.7
A declassified KGB document from July 18, 1984, reveals an interview with a trusted individual, identified as “Zh.V. A,” a qualified specialist in atomic energy. This source detailed specific technical problems plaguing not only Chernobyl but also the Kursk atomic energy station. In other words, the trusted individual was a spy.
The document describes issues with pipeline breaches at the junction of zirconium covers and steel pipes, known as the steel-zirconium adapter. The manufacturing process, involving high temperatures and pressures, left small but critical gaps in the lower part of the joint. These gaps widened during operation because of the different expansion rates of steel and zirconium, allowing corrosion particles and impurities to enter and cause further damage.
Perhaps most alarming was the difficulty in identifying these damaged joints. With approximately 1,700 such adapters in the most radioactive areas of the reactors, locating and repairing them posed a significant challenge. The only sign of damage was the appearance of wet spots in the reactor’s graphite moderator, often encompassing multiple adapters and making precise identification impossible.8
The following is a top secret report from Lieutenant Colonel A.I. Samoylov, Head of the 3rd Department of the 6th Service of the KGB Administration of the USSR for the City of Moscow:
“The design of the RBMK-1000 reactor was developed so that installation of such a shell is practically impossible (let alone without ceasing the operation of the reactor). For this reason, Leningrad, Kursk, and Chernobyl AES at the present time are the most dangerous with regards to their future use, which could have alarming consequences.”
Despite these known issues, the source showed that producing such reactors needed to continue because of the country’s power demands. This decision prioritized energy production over safety, setting the stage for future calamity.
A False Sense of Security
By the spring of 1986, a dangerous complacency had set in. People considered Chernobyl, paradoxically, to be one of the best-performing nuclear stations in the Soviet Union. The state planned to award the plant with the highest honor, the Order of Lenin. Brukhanov himself was to be awarded the star of the Hero of Socialist Labor and promoted to a position in Moscow.
The plan was to make these accolades official during the May 1 holiday. But all of that changed on April 24, when Brukhanov went from being a hero to no longer a member of his party.
In the next segment, we will explore Brukhanov’s role during and after the explosion, and how these actions played out as he learned what it meant to have every good intention but to fail so spectacularly.
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Figes, Orlando. The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin’s Russia. First Picador edition. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008.
Midnight in Chernobyl: The Untold Story of the World’s Greatest Nuclear Disaster. First Simon & Schuster hardcover edition. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2019.
“30 Years after Chernobyl Disaster, Pripyat Remains a Ghost Town – FSRN.” Accessed September 2, 2024. http://fsrn.org/2016/04/30-years-after-chernobyl-disaster-pripyat-remains-a-ghost-town/.
Midnight in Chernobyl: The Untold Story of the World’s Greatest Nuclear Disaster. First Simon & Schuster hardcover edition. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2019.
“Memo Report from Tiutiunnik, Chief of the Kiev-Sviatoshinskii District Department of the KGB Administration, to the Acting Director of the KGB Administration, Comrade G.I. Glushakov | Wilson Center Digital Archive.” Accessed August 31, 2024. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/memo-report-tiutiunnik-chief-kiev-sviatoshinskii-district-department-kgb-administration.
Reuters. “Unsealed Soviet Archives Reveal Cover-Ups at Chernobyl Plant before Disaster.” April 26, 2021, sec. World. https://www.reuters.com/world/unsealed-soviet-archives-reveal-cover-ups-chernobyl-plant-before-disaster-2021-04-26/.
Reuters. “Unsealed Soviet Archives Reveal Cover-Ups at Chernobyl Plant before Disaster.” April 26, 2021, sec. World. https://www.reuters.com/world/unsealed-soviet-archives-reveal-cover-ups-chernobyl-plant-before-disaster-2021-04-26/.
“Captain A. E. Nikifiorov, Operative Plenipotentiary of Division I, Department 2 of the Sixth Service USSR KGB Administration for Moscow and Moscow Oblast, ‘Information about an Interview with Trusted Individual “Zh. V.A.”’ | Wilson Center Digital Archive.” Accessed August 31, 2024. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/captain-e-nikifiorov-operative-plenipotentiary-division-i-department-2-sixth-service-ussr.
Great article, well done. I’d like to hear more.
well researched and written article - the recklessness due to greed is seen in corporations like Boeing and their jets falling apart in midair and now their space craft with 2 astronauts left adrift since June, 2024 with hopes SPACEX can build a craft and get them rescued by February, 2024 - and the litany of greed and lust for power we have in USA now, brought out into the open to put us all in bread lines just to control us - why? totally demonic - this article is a grim reminder to not allow this in the USA and the only way right now is to vote for President Trump and of course God and Jesus!